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Before I begin my substantive discussion, let me point out that reading this paper has 
been a great pleasure. Too few “think pieces” of this kind are being produced 
nowadays, which is rather unfortunate as I find them extremely useful. I also 
welcomed the paper’s main thrust at resurrecting development theory in a way. 
 
First of all, I would like to highlight a few points made by the paper as well as their 
implications for development theory and policy. In the second part of my discussion I 
will ask a few questions and express some doubts on the central arguments. 
 
The basic idea behind the two unbundlings has been clearly spelt out by the paper so I 
need not repeat them again. I do want to highlight, however what the implications are 
for our theoretical apparatus as well as for patterns of global development. Most 
importantly, the second unbundling implies a pattern of industrialization which 
sidesteps the national level. Before the ICT revolution, industrialization used to 
deliver and at the same time require country-specific endowments and institutions, 
such as roads, factories, engineers, domestic demand, rule of law, property rights, etc. 
Now that countries have a relatively simple option to join a supply chain, as the 
author argues, much of these things do not matter or least matter much less so than 
they used to. In a way, this is a welcome development as it simplifies industrialization 
– all you need is a certain dose of luck in terms of geographical location and healthy 
relations with multinational companies around the world. It does not, however, 
simplify development; without those benefits that industrialization used to entail, the 
entire process of industrialization becomes less meaningful. 
 
As for the implications for global development, it is fair to say that despite the 
dramatic reduction in transportation costs, we are still short of truly global supply 
chains. While the scale dimension clearly matters a lot for MNCs, they still need to 
coordinate their production processes. What we are experiencing, therefore, is a 
regionalization, as opposed to globalization of supply chains. Where the exact 
boundaries of these regions lie is somewhat unclear, but a few regional supply chains 
can be identified nevertheless. Most obviously, East Asia has developed a tightly 
connected set of supply chains. Similarly, North American and European supply 
chains share similar features. That said, the Asian unbundling has clearly been the 
most successful one, begging the question what these countries got right. 
 
Part of the answer, I believe lies in traditional development theory. We used to think 
of development as an endogenous process wherein you needed scale to industrialize 
but you needed industrialization to get the scale right. Hence the idea of the “big 
push” way of thinking about development, which hasn’t been fully formalized until 
the end of 90s by modelling issues like monopolistic competition. In this world, issues 
of coordination and multiplicity of equilibria abound, making development extremely 
tricky. Under the new rules of the game, however, much of what we thought we 
needed, such as a large domestic market, is gone. What coordination remains to be done – which part of the final product should be produced in Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Thailand etc. - will be decided by managers of large multinationals instead of 
governments. Sure enough, certain physical constraints still remain – managers, for 
instance, may want to return home after visiting their global facilities – which may 
turn out to be the next modelling exercise for economists working on development. 
 
Turning to a few questions I would like to raise, I wonder if we really have to open a 
whole new chapter in development theory. In the models of Krugman and his 
colleagues, the game that had to be played nationally could now be rescaled on a 
regional level. If Henry Kissinger was right when he said that the line of history was 
moving from the Atlantic towards East Asia, we must ask who is doing the 
coordination there. As already mentioned above, it could be multinationals 
themselves, or perhaps regional hegemons, such as China. Secondly, an equally 
vexing question is why we should care about industrialization if it is all about joining 
a supply chain. Before, the answer used to be about all sorts of positive externalities, 
forward and backward linkages (through universities and R&D for instance) that 
industrialization brought about. Now, the recipe for “success” is having basic 
facilities, such as a port and a factory, and producing as fast as possible. Is this really 
a desirable outcome, or alternatively, is this going to take us back to the enclave 
economy patterns of Bolivia in the 19
th or the Dominican Republic in the 20
th century 
where apart from the small clusters of production, the rest of society remained locked 
in the famous poverty trap? 
 
At this point, a brief defence of my colleagues, Rodrik and Hausmann is in order. 
According to them, development was a process of self-discovery, as nations gradually 
discover the unique competences they possess which allow them to compete in global 
markets. In the paper’s line of reasoning, however, this self-discovery does not matter 
anymore, as it is multinationals who decide where and what to produce. If this is 
correct, however, we must enquire about what lies behind managers’ decision to 
choose locations. Maybe these decisions still depend on certain country-specific 
attributes after all. 
 
Finally, I must point out that getting on a supply chain is no guarantee for growth. 
Evidence for this is well at hand when one compares recent growth patterns between 
the two large Latin American clusters: the Mexican and the Brazilian one. While the 
former is clearly more embedded in a global supply chain (that of North America), it 
has fared considerably worse than Brazil and its neighbours have. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 